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Johnson v. Commonwealth
529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000)
L Facts
On July 11, 1994, sixteen-year-old Shermaine A. Johnson ("Johnson")
knocked on the door of Hope Denise Hall's (Hall") apartment in Peters-
burg, Virginia. Johnson raped Hall and stabbed her fifteen times, inflicting
several fatal wounds. Hall's nude body was found on the floor of her
bedroom. The police found four bloody steak knives in Hall's apartment.
Two of the knives were in the kitchen, along with a broken drinking glass.
Johnson's blood was found on the handle of a knife found in Hall's bath-
room, on the broken glass in Hall's kitchen, and on Hall's bedspread. The
fourth knife was found on Hall's bed. Johnson's DNA, along with the
DNA of a third person, was found in sperm on a vaginal swab taken from
Hall's body.'
The Virginia Division of Forensic Science analyzed the blood and
semen samples taken from the scene of the rape and murder. Jean M.
Hamilton ("Hamilton"), the forensic scientist who performed the analyses,
testified at Johnson's trial that after performing initial tests on the samples
she performed a DNA test known as "restriction fragment length poly-
morphism" ("RFLP") on a semen sample from Hall's sheet and a semen
sample from Hall's bedspread. In March of 1996 Hamilton compiled a
DNA profile from the two samples and searched the Division of Forensic
Science's DNA data bank, but found no matching profiles. In August of
1996 Hamilton again searched the DNA data bank and found one DNA
profile that was consistent with the DNA profile of Hall's rapist. The
consistent DNA profile belonged to Johnson. Hamilton performed further
testing on a sample of Johnson's blood that was in police custody and
estimated that his DNA profile would occur in about one out of 980, or
one-tenth of one percent of African-Americans.2
Because Johnson was sixteen-years-old at the time of the crimes he was
charged by petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
of the City of Petersburg.' The juvenile court found probable cause to
believe that Johnson committed the rape and murder and certified the
charges to the grand jury. Johnson was charged and tried as an adult be-
1. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Va. 2000).
2. Id. at 774-75. Johnson is African-American.
3. Id. at 772-73; see VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-241(A)(1) (Michie 2000) (providing for




cause he had previously been tried and convicted of rape as an adult.4 The
April 1997 grand jury issued two indictments against Johnson, alleging rape
in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-61 and capital murder in the
commission of rape or attempted rape in violation of Virginia Code section
18.2-31(5). s On June 17, 1998, Johnson filed a motion in the circuit court
to dismiss the indictments on the ground that the circuit court had violated
former Virginia Code section 16.1-269.6(B).6 On June 29, 1998, the court
entered an order pursuant to section 16.1-269.6(B) authorizing the attorney
for the Commonwealth to seek indictments against Johnson. The grand
jury returned new, identical indictments on July 2, 1998.
A jury found Johnson guilty of rape and of capital murder in the
commission of rape or attempted rape The jury found both aggravating
factors, future dangerousness and vileness, and recommended a sentence of
death.9 After his conviction, Johnson moved the court to dismiss the
indictments on the ground that the Commonwealth violated former Vir-
ginia Code sections 16.1-263 to -264 by failing to notify Johnson's father of
the transfer hearings in juvenile court. The court denied the motion and
sentenced Johnson to life in prison on the rape conviction and to death on
the capital murder conviction. 0
Johnson appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia and asserted the
following claims: (1) the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the United States Constitution and the Constitution
of Virginia; (2) Virginia's death penalty statutes do not provide meaningful
4. Jo/mson, 529 S.E.2d at 777. Virginia Code S 16.1-271 states that "[a]ny juvenile who
is tried and convicted in a circuit court ... shall be considered and treated as an adult in any
criminal proceeding resulting from any future alleged criminal acts." VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-
271 (Mchie 2000).
5. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 773; see VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-61 (Michie 2000) (defining
rape as engaging in sexual intercourse against a victim's will by force, threat or intimidation,
or through the use of the victim's mental or physical incapacity); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-
31(5) (Michie 2000) (defining one of the predicates for capital murder as "willful, deliberate,
and premeditated kilin g of any person in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape).
6. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 773. The opinion of the court makes reference to former
Virginia Code S 16.1-296(B). However, the requirement to which the court refers in its
opinion appears in former Virginia Code S 16.1-269.6(B). Former S 16.1-269.6(B) required
the circuit court to review the transfer documents from the juvenile court before allowing.
the Commonwealth to seek indictments against a juvenile in the circuit court. VA. CODE
ANN. S 16.1-269.6(B) (Michie 1994).
7. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 772-73; see S 16.1-269.6(B).
8. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 773.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see 1997 Va. Acts ch. 441 (requiring a juvenile court, after a petition has been
filed to "direct the issuance of summonses, one directed to the juvenile... and another to the
parents, guardian.. . and such other persons as appear to the court to be proper or necessary
parties to the proceedings"); VA. CODE ANN. 5 16.1-263 (Michie 1997).
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guidance to jurors; (3) the aggravating factor of "vileness" is unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad; (4) the aggravating factor of "future dangerous-
ness" is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally permits the consid-
eration of unadjudicated conduct; (5) the penalty phase instructions do not
adequately instruct the jury about mitigation; and (6) the trial court's post-
verdict review of the death sentence is not constitutional because the trial
court may consider hearsay evidence from a pre-sentence report and is not
required to set aside the death sentence upon a showing of good cause.'
Johnson also asserted that the trial court erred in denying the following
motions: (1) to dismiss the indictments because of errors in the juvenile
transfer proceedings; (2) to suppress the evidence obtained by a search
warrant because of unreasonable delay in its execution; (3) for appointment
of co-counsel with expertise in DNA evidence; (4) to exclude evidence of
prior crimes offered to prove identity;' and (5) to allow evidence of third
party guilt. Johnson contested the trial court's overruling of his Batson
challenge, the Commonwealth's chain of custody of his blood sample, and
the trial court's allowance of courtroom spectators wearing buttons featur-
ing Hall's picture. Johnson also challenged the constitutionality of Vir-
ginia's DNA data bank, the qualifications of the Commonwealth's expert




The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected all of Johnson's claims and
affirmed his death sentence.
13
11. Jobnson 529 S.E.2d at 776.
12. Id. at 776-85.
13. The Supreme Court of Virginia tersely rejected the following arguments, which
will not be discussed in detail in this note: (1) imposition of the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment; (2) Virginia's death penalty statutes do not provide meaningful guidance
to the jury; () the aggravating factor of vileness" is vague and overbroad; (4) the future
dangerousness factor is vague and unconstitutionally permits the consideration ofunadjudicated conduct; (5) the penalty phase instructions do not adequately instruct the jury
about mitigation; and (6) the trial court's post-verdict review of the death sentence does not
pass constitutional muster because the court may consider hearsay evidence and is notrequired to set aside the senten e of death upon a showi g of good cause. Id. at 776.
The following rulings also will not be discuse in detail: (1) Johnson waived his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's inability to evaluate DNA evidence bywithdrawing his request for appointment of co-counsel and requesting and receiving appoint-
ment of a DNA expert; (2) Jo fn did not rebut the Commonwealth's evidence of the chain
of custody of his blood sample that was included in the DNA data bank; (3) the court refused
to disturb the trial court's ruling that the Commonwealth's expert witnesses were qualified
to testify about DNA analysis and statistics; (4) the trial court'did not abuse its discretion inrefusing to allow the testimony that Johnson proffered regarding the alleged guilt of a third
p arty, particularly since the third party had been eliminated as a possible source of DNA
at the crime scene; and (5) the evidence was sufficient to proveJohnson guilty of Hall's
2000]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [
'IlI. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Motions to Suppress Fruits of Search Warrant
Johnson argued that there was an unreasonable delay between the date
his DNA was first matched with DNA from the crime scene and the date
that the search warrant was executed. He argued that the fruits of the
search, his statement, blood sample, and hair samples, should be suppressed
because of the unreasonable delay of thirty two lays. The Supreme Court
of Virginia rejected Johnson's argument because the DNA and other physi-
cal samples "were not subject to change over the 32-day period at issue. "14
The standard for determining the "staleness" of a search warrant is whether,
at the time the search is actually conducted, the allegations in the warrant
give probable cause to believe that the execution of the warrant will lead to
the discovery of relevant evidence." The court also held that Johnson's
statement to the police upon the execution of the warrant was properly
admitted since the warrant was valid.16
B. Constitutionality of DNA Data Bank
Johnson argued that Virginia Code sections 19.2-310.2 through -310.7,
providing for the DNA data bank maintained by the Virginia Department
of Forensic Sciences, violated numerous federal and state constitutional
rights.17 Johnson claimed that the statutory scheme violated the Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth
Amendment protection from self-incrimination, the Eighth Amendment
protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and the constitutional right
to due process, along with the parallel provisions of the Constitution of
Virginia. 8 Johnson also criticized the statutes as being arbitrary, failing "to
establish meaningful restrictions on the seizure and dissemination of DNA
material" and being an "undue delegation of [legislative] powers." 9 Thecourt rejected all of Johnson's arguments.20
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with two cases decided b th
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,Jones v. Murra nd
rape. Proof of a charge of rape requires proof of penetration by a penis of a vagina, and proof
that the sexual intercourse was accomplished by force, threat, or intimidation, against the
victim's will. The court stated that ' the presence of Johnson's sperm in Hall's vagina alone
is sufficient to support the finding that penetration occurred." The court also found that
Hall's fifteen stab wounds, facial abrasions, and broken fingernail constituted "overwhelm-
ing" evidence that the sexual intercourse was against Hall's will. Id. at 781-85.
14. Id. at 778-79.
15. Id. at 778.
16. Id. at 779.
17. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-310.2 to -310.7 (Michie 2000).
18. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 779.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 779-80.
21. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Ewell v. Murray.2 The cases stand for the proposition that Virginia's DNA
data bank statutory scheme does not violate the Fourth Amendment guar-
antee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.23 The Jones court
held that "in the case of convicted felons who are in the custody of the
Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of
a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia's interest... in... improved law
enforcement."2" The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the same conclu-
sion applied to the parall provision of the Constitution of Virginia.2  The
court relied on Schmerber v. California26 for its conclusion tlat giving a
blood sample is not a communicative or testimonial act, and therefore does
not implicate one's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The court further found that the statutory scheme does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and the parallel
provision of the Constitution of Virginia, since "[tihe DNA statutes are not
penal in nature."28 The court rejected Johnson's due process and arbitrary
nature arguments by stating that the enactment of the statutory scheme
provided adequate notice that all persons convicted of a felony in Virginia
will be required to give a blood sample and that the statutory scheme applies
equally to every convicted felon." Finally, the court noted that the statu-
tory scheme restricts the use of DNA collected from each felon to law
enforcement purposes and therefore provides "meaningful restrictions on
the seizure and dissemination of DNA material.""
C. Batson Challenge
Johnson argued that the trial court erred in rejecting his Batson chal-
lenge to the jury panel. 1 The prosecutor used each of her five peremptory
22. Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections regulations taking away good conduct credits of inmates who refused
to provide a blood sample for the DNA data bank did not violate the Fourth Amendment);
see Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305-08 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that Virginia's statutory
provision for collecting DNA samples and storing them in a data bank does not violate the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures).
23. Eweil, 11 F.3d at 484; Jones, 962 F.2d at 305-08.
24. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
25. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 779.
26. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
27. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 779; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,760-771(1966)
(holding that the withdrawal of a blood sample by medical personnel, at the direction of a
police officer and despite the defendant's refusal to consent, did not violate the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment protection against
search and seizure).
28. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 779.
29. Id. at 780.
30. Id.
31. - Id.; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson requires that once a defen-
dant has made a prima fade case of discriminatory strikes a prosecutor must state race-neutral
2000]
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strikes to strike African-Americans from the jury panel. 2 Johnson raised
his Batson challenge, and the trial court ruled against him, noting "[i]t's clear
the jury is predominantly black."" The jury panel included ten African-
Americans, one Hispanic, and three Caucasians.' The trial judge found that
Johnson had not established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
on the part of the prosecutor." Therefore, the prosecutor was not required
to state race-neutral reasons for exercising each of her peremptory strikes
against African-Americans.3' The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that
"[t]he trial court's determination whether discrimination has occurred in
the selection of a jury is entitled to great deference."37 The court noted that
the burden is on the defendant to identify facts and circumstances, beyond
the fact that the prosecution has exercised peremptory strikes against
members of a certain race, to suggest that the prosecutor was engaged in
purposeful discrimination, and found that Johnson had not offered any such
facts or circumstances.38
D. Spectator Buttons Depicting Victim
Johnson asserted that the juiy was improperly influenced by court-
room spectators' display of "campaig-size" buttons showing a photograph
of Hall." At the beginning of the trial Johnson objected to the presence of
the buttons in the courtroom.' The trial court ruled that the buttons could
not be displayed "in any manner that would allow the jurors to see them,"
and that "anyone wearing a button was required to refrain from any contact
with any of the jurors."", The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that John-
son had waived his objections to the display of the buttons because he failed
to object to the trial court's ruling or to subsequently object to any specta-
tor's display of a button. 2 The court specifically noted the absence of any
reasons for each of the peremptory strikes exercised. To make such a prima fade case, the
defendant must show that he is a member of a co gn ble racial group and that the prosecutor
has used peremptory strikes to remove potentiaurors who are members of the defendant's
racial group. The defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor's actions along with any
other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the peremptory strikes were used to
exclude potential jurors on the basis of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.






38. Id. at 780-81.
39. Id. at 781.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 781-82.
42. Id. at 782.
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evidence in the record that any juror saw the buttons or could tell what
they depicted.43 The court's ruling on this issue underscores the importance
of noting objections for the record and following up on them each time an
objectionable event occurs. An objection to the display of buttons of this
type should state what the buttons depict and that spectators are wearing
them in the presence of jurors who could be improperly influenced by such
displays.
E. Evidence of Other Crimes Admitted to Prove Identity
Johnson argued that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of
two women Johnson had raped prior to the rape and murder of Hall."
Johnson maintained that the three cases were not so similar as to permit an
inference that he committed all three rapes.45 The Supreme Court of
Virginia rejected his argument and held that the testimony of the two
victims was properly admitted to show Johnson's identity.
In general, evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible to ?rove a defen-
dant's guilt of a subsequent crime for which he is on trial. 7 One of the
ways to skirt the general rule is to offer evidence of other crimes for the
purpose of showing a perpetrator's identity, including showing proof of
modus operandi to prove identity, so long as the probative value of the
evidence offered outweighs the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence.4
The court relied on Chichester v. Commonwealth9 for the standard of
admissibility of modus operandi evidence: "it is sufficient if the other crimes
bear a 'singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged.'"'s
The court concluded that the two prior rapes and the rape in the
present case bore "a singular-strong resemblance to one another, based on
common incidents that are sufficiently idiosyncratic to establish the proba-
bility of a common perpetrator.""1 Some of the similarities of the crimes
included the similar status of the victims as young African-American
women who knew Johnson, the use of steak knives procured in each of the
victims' homes and the fact that there were no signs of forced entry into the
homes in which the rapes occurred. The court also pointed to the fact that
a broken bloodstained glass was found in Hall's kitchen, while Johnson
43. Id. at 781.





49. 448 S.E.2d 638 (Va. 1994).
50. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 782 (quoting Chichester v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638,




asked the other two victims for a glass of water before he attacked them.
Finally, all three rapes were committed within a sixty day period. 2 The
court concluded that the probative value of such evidence outweighed its
prejudicial effect."
F. Review of Death Sentence
Virginia Code section 17.1-313(C) requires the Supreme Court of
Virginia to review death sentences to determine whether they are (1) im-
posed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor; and (2) excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases.' Johnson argued that the admission of certain victim impact
evidence caused the jury to impose the death sentence under the influence
of passion." The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the victim impact
testimony was admissible and that the evidence of the other rapes was
admissible as evidence of future dangerousness. The court also reviewed
the entire record and found "no evidence that the death sentence was
'imposed under the' influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor. '" "
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed Johnson's death sentence to
determine whether it was proportionate to the sentences given in similar
cases with similar defendants5 8 The court gave "particular consideration"
to similar cases in which the death sentence was imposed under both aggra-
vating factors, vileness and future dangerousness. Other factors that the
court considered included the following: (1) Johnson's age at the time of the
offense; (2) the fact that Johnson committed five rapes within seven months;
(3) the beating and stabbing of one of Johnson's other rape victims; and (4)
an "escalating pattern of violence" culminating in the stabbing of Hall.
6
The court stated that juries "generally, with some exceptions, have imposed
the death sentence for convictions of capital murder based on findings of
future dangerousness and vileness in which the underlying predicate crimes
52. Id. at 782-83.
53. Id. at 782.
54. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (C) (Michie 2000).
55. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 785. Hall's mother, the father of Hai's son, and two other
women that Johnson raped were allowed to testify. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 785-86.
58. Id. at 786; see VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 2000) (requiring the Supreme
Court of Virginia to review the record of a case resulting in a sentence of death for error at
trial, imposition of sentence under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor, and excessiveness or disproportionality of the sentence in comparison to the sentences
imposed in other cases with similar crimes and defendants).
59. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 786.
60. Id.
[Vol. 13:1
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involved violent sexual offenses and the defendant had committed violent
offenses on other occasions."61 The court found that Johnson's death
sentence was neither disproportionate nor excessive.62
Melissa A. Ray
61. Id.
62. Id.
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